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The Historical Roots of Regional
Sentencing Variation
Ian Weinstein*
I want to thank Professor David Zlotnick and the Editors of
the Roger Williams University Law Review for giving me this
opportunity to offer my own speculative thoughts on the deep
roots of regional sentencing variation in America and what they
may tell us about our current sentencing practices and
aspirations. I am a law professor and a criminal defense lawyer,
not a historian. It is with some trepidation that I stand before you
to suggest that our very persistent regional sentencing variations
have roots in the political struggles of Reformation England and
the cultures of the subgroups that populated the first American
colonies. I rely upon others for the historical proof, as you will see,
but I think I do have standing to argue to you that we should
consider whether or not there is room, even in federal sentencing,
to account for deeply embedded regional variations in our basic
conceptions of why and how we should punish. Aware as I am of
the dangers of essentializing and the ugly history of regional
variation in American penal practices, I still want to ask whether
Pennsylvanians really should be expected to punish transgressors
in exactly the same way as Virginians. I will suggest to you that
perhaps we should respect a modicum of regional variation and
not seek to eliminate every vestige of regional legal culture in
America.
I have long been interested in the hydraulic pressure of
discretion in federal sentencing. I started practicing in the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Supervising
Attorney, Fordham Criminal Defense Clinic. I want to thank Daniel Capra,
Daniel Freed, Michael M. Martin, Daniel Richman and Ronald J. Wright for
their comments.
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Southern District of New York in the twilight of the old law
regime. I was in that relatively high volume federal defender
practice when Mistretta' brought the fractious lower courts into
line and made everyone grapple with the Guidelines in day-to-day
practice. Like all of my colleagues, I sought every chink and
groove in the seemingly smooth edifice of the Guidelines and
asked every judge in front of whom I appeared to release a bit of
the now dammed up waters of discretion to bathe each of my
clients in the cool waters of mitigation. Many were happy to
release a trickle and often, at least in the beginning, we splashed
around a good deal at sentencing.
As harsh as many of those sentences seemed to me, I came to
understand that sentences in the Southern District of New York
were often more moderate than sentences in many other federal
courts. I learned that experienced lawyers might transfer a case
under Rule 202 to Philadelphia or Minneapolis, but would think
twice about sending a case up to Boston and would think long and
hard before sending a client down to Virginia or South Carolina.
The deals were better and the sentences more lenient, in a
seemingly predictable way, in some places.
When I went into the academy, as we say about the wonderful
opportunity to teach, I tried to look at variation and disparity in a
more systematic way. In 1998, I looked at the treatment of
downward departure cases under the then recent Koon3 standard
and found that at that time, the Second Circuit had never met a
downward departure it did not like, while the Fourth Circuit had
4not yet seen a downward departure of which it could approve.
1. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the
Sentencing Guidelines against constitutional challenge on separation of
powers grounds).
2. Rule 20 permits a defendant arrested in a district other than that in
which the charges are pending to resolve the case in the district of arrest,
with the consent of prosecutors in both districts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20.
Although disposition in the district of arrest is not always available, it is
generally only strategically desirable if the defendant has reason to believe
he or she will receive better treatment in the district of arrest.
3. United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996) (holding
that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of district court
decisions to depart downward from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and
applying that standard to reverse some departure grounds and affirm others
in the case of the two police officers convicted in the beating of Rodney King).
4. Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion:
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Next I looked at rates of cooperation departures under §5K.1.1
and found tremendous local variation.5 In 1999, I found that there
were five times as many cooperation departures in the ten highest
cooperation districts as compared to the ten districts with the
lowest rates of cooperation.6
Of course neither of these snapshots of particular practices
permitted me to say much about overall sentence length and
severity. As we all know, federal sentencing is a complex system
with many moving parts. My aim in that work was to understand
two mechanisms which permitted localization of results. I could
not say anything about the impact on overall sentencing patterns
for a number of reasons. For example, studying Circuit Court
cases only tells one how the appellate court ruled on the cases that
were appealed. In a district in which the prosecutor agrees to
many downward departures, there may be very few cases
appealed, but those that are appealed will tend to be weaker and
may be more likely to be reversed.
Thus a high rate of reversals of downward departure could be
evidence of harsh overall sentencing achieved through few agreed-
upon departures and restrictive appellate review or it could be
evidence of lenient overall sentencing, achieved through many
agreed-upon departures and appellate rejection of the relatively
few and weaker departure arguments rejected by the prosecutor
and pressed by defense lawyers. This is just one example of how
complex federal sentencing is and how dangerous it can be to
generalize from the appellate cases or from raw sentencing
statistics. More recent and more methodologically sophisticated
work suggests that much interdistrict variation turns on caseload
type and caseload volume.8  Another important and more
Koon's Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the
Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 495-96 (1999) (finding that some of the
circuits reversed virtually no district court departures under the abuse of
discretion standard).
5. See generally Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 563 (1999) (discussing the broad prosecutorial discretion in the
area of substantial assistance departures and the court's role once the
prosecutor makes a substantial assistance departure motion).
6. Id. at 602-03.
7. Id. at 568-69.
8. Katherine Tang Newberger, Caseload Matters: Caseload Composition
as an Explanation for Regional Sentencing Differences, 15 FED. SENT'G REP.
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theoretical take on these questions is recent work that
thoughtfully discusses how much and what kinds of variation are
desirable within our federal structure.9 We need to deepen our
understanding of sentencing through sophisticated empirical work
and careful theoretical work to help us think about variation and
disparity in the post-Booker world.
My topic, however, is neither the details of federal sentencing,
nor the theory behind our federal structure. Today I want to draw
a very broad picture and see if any of you share my sense of
recognition. As I look at the post-Booker1 ° landscape, I note that if
a defendant does not want to receive a "Guideline sentence," and
many do not, the old lore holds true. Stay in the Second, Third,
D.C., Sixth or Ninth Circuits.1' Those are the circuits below the
national average for post-Booker sentences within the guidelines.
2
If your case is in the First, Seventh or Eighth Circuits, you are not
too much above the national average, but as you move south and
west, the average goes up in this order: The Fourth Circuit,
followed by the Tenth, with the deep south Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits having the highest rates of compliance with the now
advisory Guidelines. 3  I recognize, of course, the dangers of
equating Guidelines compliance with harsh sentencing. It is,
however, a defensible generalization with many exceptions. There
are draconian judges whose instincts are moderated by the
Guidelines, but they are less common than the judges who would,
197 (2003) (finding that the types of cases prosecuted in a given district or
region explains a portion of regional sentencing variations). This article is
part of a symposium issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter that included
an illuminating panel discussion of regional sentencing variations, moderated
by Professor Daniel Freed, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 165 (2003).
9. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing,
58 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2005) (arguing that while some local variation is an
acceptable step away from the uniformity of federal law, much of the current
variation is unacceptable and proper regulation requires analysis of all
sources of variation, including prosecutorial discretion).
10. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (excising portions of
Federal Sentencing Guidelines that made them binding to remedy a violation
of Sixth Amendment right to jury trial).
11. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL POST BOOKER CODING PROJECT,
GUIDELINE APPLICATION TRENDS, NATIONAL AND CIRCUIT 7-11, Data through
Sept. 30, 2005, www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_101305.pdf (last visited
Dec. 19, 2005).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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from time to time, exercise more leniency than the Guidelines
would suggest.
The overall compliance rate of the Circuit in which the
sentence occurs may not be a strong predictor, and it may well be
overwhelmed by information about the particular district or
district judge, but absent other information, the criminal defense
lawyer in me would prefer that my client be sentenced in the
Circuits that have lower rates of post-Booker compliance with the
Guidelines. The compliance rates follow the standard lore pretty
closely, and that is the coincidence that really got me thinking. In
fact, the pattern of compliance rates fits the story I want to tell
perfectly - so perfectly that I think it will intrigue you as it has
really intrigued me. Why has it so long been true that New York
and Pennsylvania have different, and less severe, sentencing
practices from New England, which differ again from the Upper
Midwest and from the South, where sentencing practices remain
harsher, even putting aside the well known death belt map?
14
Why have twenty years of sentencing reform failed to eradicate
this pattern? Perhaps these deep differences are a part of the
reason those reforms have foundered. My suggestion to you is
that each region retains a distinctive idea of what constitutes a
transgression worthy of criminal punishment and how
transgressions should be punished. The remarkable part is that
the ideas are hundreds of years old, have recognizable roots in the
mists of English history and have persisted through centuries of
change and ferment. Let me tell you the story of how and why
that may be.
In telling this story, I rely upon the wonderful book, Albion's
Seed: Four British Folkways in America, by David Hackett
Fischer. 5 This application of Prof. Hackett Fischer's ideas to our
current sentencing regime is entirely my own and I want to be
clear that this wonderful book is a serious work of history and
makes no claims about the relationship between colonial America
and post-Booker Guidelines compliance rates. What Prof. Hackett
Fischer does argue is that Colonial America was settled in four
great waves of migration from Great Britain to North America
14. Id.
15. DAVID HAcKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOuR BRITIsH FOLKWAYS IN
AMERICA (1989).
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during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.1 6 Each
wave of migration brought a distinct cultural subgroup from Great
Britain, characterized by a set of folkways. Prof. Hackett Fischer
tells us that a folkway is:
... the normative structure of values, customs, and
meanings that exist in any culture. This complex is not
many things but one thing, with many interlocking parts.
It is not primarily biological or instinctual in origin, as
Sumner believed, but social and intellectual. Folkways
do not arise from the unconscious in even a symbolic
sense-though most people do many social things without
reflecting very much about them...
A folkway should not be though of in Sumner's sense as
something ancient and primitive which has been
inherited from the distant past. Folkways are often
highly persistent, but they are never static... 17
Prof. Hackett Fischer then lists twenty-four elements that are
included in every folkway.'8 These include patterns of written and
spoken language, family structure and function, regulation of
gender relationships and religious practice. 19 Most importantly for
our purposes, he also discusses Order Ways, which he describes
as, "ideas of order, ordering institutions, forms of disorder, and
treatment of the disorderly."2' Although other aspects of folkways
are relevant, Order Ways are central to how each group defined
transgressions against civil authority and punished them as
21
crimes.
Prof. Hackett Fischer argues, very convincingly I think, that
each of the four groups, the Puritans in New England, the
Quakers in the Delaware Valley, the Cavaliers in the Coastal
South and the Lowland Scots in the Upland South, brought a
distinctive set of folkways.22  More importantly, recognizable
16. Id. at 785-88.
17. Id. at 7-8.
18. Id. at 8-9.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id. at 11 n.10 (listing empirical indicators used to discuss order
ways).
22. Id. at 9-11.
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traces of those folkways remain evident in modern America in
each of those regions and in the parts of the country settled by
each of those cultures.23 Clearly the persistence of these folkways
is a very complicated question in contemporary America, but let's
see if the story Prof. Hackett Fischer tells rings as true to you in
the area of contemporary federal sentencing as it did to me.
The story. of the great British migrations to America is also
the story of the religious and political ferment of seventeenth
century England. As we all know, the Puritans came to America
to escape the religious intolerance that was a major part of the
political repression that led to the English Civil War and the
execution of Charles I in 1649. Perhaps somewhat less well-
known today24 is that when England became more Puritan-
friendly upon the death of Charles I and Puritan migration to
America decreased, England also became a much more difficult
place for supporters of monarchy like the Royalists, or Cavaliers,
who staged their own great migration to Virginia during
Cromwell's rule in the Commonwealth period. The Mason Dixon
line is a nineteenth century creation, but its roots go back to
England. In seventeenth century England, the Puritans were
persecuted by, and later persecuted, the Cavaliers. Those
animosities were not forgotten by those who came to America.
Deep as the common bonds forged by the Revolution and over two
23. The Puritan folkways spread through upstate New York and into
parts of the Upper Midwest, while the Quaker folkways spread into other
parts of the upper Midwest. The Lowland Scots folkways of the Upland
South spread into much of what we call the Sunbelt today, while the Gulf
Coast received a stronger measure of the Cavalier coastal south folkways.
HAcKETT FISCHER, supra note 15, at 812-16.
For the provocative argument that New York City and its metropolitan
area retain significant traces of its Dutch heritage which set it apart from
both New England and Delaware, see, RUSSELL SHORTO, THE ISLAND AT THE
CENTER OF THE WORLD: THE EPIC STORY OF DUTCH MANHATTAN AND THE
FORGOTTEN COLONY THAT SHAPED AMERICA (2004).
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge to this audience Rhode
Island's special place as the home of dissent and toleration in New England
in an intolerant Colonial New England, a history whose traces can still be felt
in the Ocean State. A useful and short biography of the state's founder,
highlighting his struggle to separate from the Massachusetts Bay Colony, is,
Edwin S. Gaustad's book Roger Williams. EDWIN S. GAUsTAD, ROGER
WILLIAMS (2005).
24. Perhaps we have been less interested in celebrating our royalist roots
than in celebrating our dissenting roots.
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hundred years of living as one nation are, sectional differences,
the fracture of the Civil War and the regional stresses that persist
today have deep roots. The differences are not limited to Boston
and Virginia. As we shall see, each of the four groups mentioned
above brought something distinctive to America and traces of each
remain identifiable.
The Puritan folkways regarding punishment reflected their
desire for order, understood as social unity." For them, the
greatest virtue was obedience to the will of the community, which
in turn reflected the will of heaven.26 Their great love of obedience
and the intensity of their striving for order led to the somewhat
paradoxical fact that theirs was, and by some measures remains,
the American subculture that combined relatively less violencewithreltivly hrshr " 27
with relatively harsher punishment. Their culture encouraged
and achieved a relatively high degree of obedience, so they had
relatively less need for violent enforcement of the law, yet their
horror of disobedience led them to punish it severely.28
One measure of the strength of this folkway is seen in the
kind of criminal cases prosecuted in the Puritan courts. In New
England, crimes against public order, such as Sabbath breaking,
were the most common kind of cases.29 This reflected both the
Puritan view that social unity was the proper measure of order,
and also their desire to enforce group norms.3 ° Property crimes
came next and crimes of violence were last in order of frequency
on the docket.
31
While striving for order as social unity appears to have
successfully limited individual violence and strengthened the idea
that criminal offenses were an affront to the group, rather than an
individual, the strength of Puritan devotion to group unity fueled
the tendency to punish harshly. 2 The Puritans famously enforced
social order by burning witches at the stake, hanging and flogging
Quakers and publicly humiliating adulterers. The Puritans lived
25. HAcKET FISCHER, supra note 9, at 189-96 (discussing Puritan order
ways).
26. Id. at 189-90.
27. Id. at 192.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 191-92.
30. Id. at 189.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 192.
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in a world in which peace reigned among men, but state violence
was readily visited upon those who transgressed against group
norms.
The Cavaliers who settled Virginia brought a distinctly
different idea of order.33 Theirs was a Royalist and Anglican
influenced hierarchical notion of order.34 Violations of order
offended either the authority of a superior or the honor of an
equal, not the norms of the group.35 In either case, violation of
public order offended an identifiable individual, not the unified
social order. This aristocratic, hierarchical and individualist
social order was enforced with both frequent state violence and
customary, private violence. Superiors were entitled, and
perhaps expected, to use violence against their social inferiors and
social equals could use violence against each other.38
The courts were not as busy in Virginia as they were in New
England and they heard a different mix of cases.39 Violent crimes
occurred more frequently than crimes against property.40 The
Virginia courts heard very few cases involving offenses against
public order and morality. 4' This paints an overall picture of the
criminal justice system in colonial Virginia as part of a larger
system in which both official state violence and state-sanctioned
private violence were used to maintain social hierarchy and
redress affronts to personal dignity, honor and power.4 2
The Quakers brought a third distinctive set of ideas of order
and transgression to the New World when they came to
Philadelphia and the mid-Atlantic region in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth century.43 The Quakers saw order as social
peace, rather than social unity or preservation of hierarchy.44 For
the Quakers in America, social peace was realized when
33. Id. at 398-405 (discussing Cavalier order ways).
34. Id. at 398.
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 400.
38. Id. at 400-03.
39. Id. at 404.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 404-05.
43. Id. at 584-89 (discussing the Delaware order ways).
44. Id. at 584.
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individuals did not intrude upon others and the government left
each person alone.45 The colonial courts of the mid-Atlantic region
saw very few prosecutions for crimes against public order and
morality; most that were prosecuted were cases involving defiance
of the local elected peace-keeping officers.46 Those same courts
heard roughly equal numbers of cases involving violations of
private rights and crimes against persons, in contrast to New
England, where private right cases predominated and the South,
where violent crimes predominated.47
Most notably, the Quakers reduced the number of capital
offenses from more than two hundred to just two in the early
eighteenth century.48 They also adopted penal practices oriented
toward rehabilitation, rather than punishment.49  In those
instances where state violence was used, it was to punish crimes
against the peace of another rather than violations of social unity
or hierarchy.50 The Quakers' view of order as peace, combined
with their belief in individual conscience, led to a system of
relatively less harsh punishment, often deployed in defense of
individual autonomy and more oriented toward rehabilitation. 51
The fourth wave of migration to the New World was that of
the Lowland Scots, often called the Scots-Irish, who came
throughout much of the eighteenth century.52 These people came
seeking economic opportunity and settled the upland South, or
backcountry, inland from the rich coastal lands settled by the
Cavaliers. 53 This group had its origins in the border lands
between England and Scotland, a region characterized by a long
history of unremitting hostility between the formerly dominant
Scots and the rising English. Long characterized by border wars
and resistance to growing English authority, these settlers
brought a fierce individualism and strong commitment to family,
clan and locality.- Order in the backcountry was imposed by the
45. Id. at 585.
46. Id. at 586-87.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 587.
49. Id. at 589.
50. Id. at 588.
51. Id. at 588-89.
52. Id. at 608-09.
53. Id. at 633-34.
54. Id. at 605-14 (discussing the geographic and social origins of those
2006]HISTORICAL ROOTS OF SENTENCING VARIATION 505
individual, and society was characterized by a very capacious
private sphere in which civil authority did not operate.55
The backcountry idea of transgression was an extreme form of
the Cavalier notion that crime was predominately a violation of
personal, rather than group, rights. Largely unmitigated by ideas
of hierarchy and authority, backcountry order was defined by the
lex talionis,56 and enforced by both state and private violence. In
the backcountry, crimes of violence predominated in the courts,
far outnumbering crimes against property and crimes against the
moral order.57 In these courts, property crimes were often
punished more harshly than crimes of violence, which were an
accepted part of the culture.8 In the backcountry, crime was
personal and best redressed by swift violence; official action was
an unattractive second best.59
In this broad summary of one small part of a very careful and
impressive piece of scholarship, I know I have not done justice to
Prof. Hackett Fischer. My broad story of hierarchical Cavaliers,
authoritarian Puritans, peaceful Quakers and violent, libertarian
backcountry settlers, reduces a very complex phenomenon to such
vague generalities that some may find the picture unrecognizable
or of no explanatory value. For me, however, this picture offers
some explanation of the great persistence of regional sentencing
variations in America.
The broad pattern of harsher sentences and greater devotion
to the letter of the Guidelines, which distinguishes the South and
Sunbelt from other parts of the country, carries echoes of the
folkways of the Cavaliers and lowland Scots. 60 The primacy of
who settled the Upland South).
55. Id. at 765-71 (discussing backcountry order ways).
56. Lex talionis is Latin for law of retribution or perhaps law as
retribution. The idea is often traced to the Code of Hammurabi and the
Biblical injunction, "an eye for an eye." While there is a vivid debate about
whether the ancient principle is best understood as a mitigating reform,
imposing specific and graduated penalties rather than simply imposing death
for all offenses, in modern usage the idea is best understood as a relatively
stark kind of retributivism. Id. at 765.
57. Id. at 768.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 765-66.
60. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 633-42 (statistical appendix listing means
for overall sentences and percentages of guideline departures by district and
state).
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retribution as the main justification for punishment reflects their
continued devotion to the lex talionis. Harsh sentencing also
reflects a relatively greater preference for violence, now channeled
into state-imposed punishment, as an appropriate response to
disorder.
I also suggest that the continued willingness of courts to
impose sentences within the Guidelines is, in part, a carryover of
devotion to a more hierarchical notion of social order in which
positive rules carry even greater force.61 Hierarchical ideas of
social order may well have made it easier for all of the actors in
the system to accept very lengthy sentences for relatively lower
level players in narcotics and financial fraud cases, echoing as it
does the folkway of greater willingness to impose harsh penalties
upon lower status people. The idea that crime is an affront to the
honor of each individual victim, rather than the group as a whole,
also helps explain the greater attraction of the victims' rights
movement in those parts of the country and the continued vitality
of the more straightforward idea of retribution in the lex talionis.
In contrast, New England, the Mid-Atlantic states and their
colonies throughout much of the upper Midwest, continue to rely
on the state to sanction violators in order to uphold ideas of social
order as unity or peace.62 This conception of disorder provides less
fuel for harsh sentencing than the personal ethos of the Cavaliers;
the tendency to focus on the offender in relation to society takes
the focus off the offender/victim dyad. The relatively less violent
cultures of New England, and particularly the Mid-Atlantic
region, begot less state-sanctioned violence in the form of harsh
punishments, but there is a story to be told about the
transmission of the Puritan taste for extreme violence to support
social order, which lingers on in somewhat harsher sentencing in
New England.
Perhaps the clearest way that this history continues to inform
American sentencing is in the vibrancy of restorative justice as a
61. I suspect there is also a story to be told about the role of religious
fundamentalism in encouraging plain meaning arguments in American law,
but Professor Hackett Fischer might suggest that we consider whether
contemporary fundamentalism (which has deep roots but is distinctively
influenced by innovations dating from the turn of the twentieth century) is a
cause or a consequence of the pre-existing folkways.
62. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 633-42.
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sentencing idea in the Mid-Atlantic and upper Midwest.63
Although unevenly distributed, the interest in restorative justice
has clear roots in the Quaker penological ideas of rehabilitation
and reintegration of the offender. Beyond restorative justice, it is
also the case that sentences appear to remain most lenient in
Pennsylvania and parts of the Midwest, reflecting the old Quaker
idea of order as peace and the strong Quaker distaste for
violence.6
Of course there is so much more to be said about our nation,
its history and how we got to our present condition. I particularly
want to reemphasize the tentative and broad nature of this piece,
which I mean to provoke thought, not prove an argument. I note
again, as I did at the outset, the grave dangers of essentializing, or
trying to explain complex phenomena by one or two variables,
particularly when the phenomena are views on order and
authority and the explanation has the flavor of race or national
origin. I explicitly deny any claim that modern American judges
or lawyers hold a particular view on sentencing because they are
members of a particular ethnic subgroup. I have made no effort to
study the backgrounds of any judges and lawyers, nor do I
understand Prof. Hackett Fischer to be making a claim about
racial or ethnic background. Quite the reverse, it seems to me
that the power of his argument is the very remarkable claim that
in modern, mobile, diverse America, discernible differences persist
between Richmond and Boston, even though the people who live in
those places and execute the laws have changed so much.65
I also hope it goes without saying that there is much more
that unites us as Americans than divides us as residents of one
region or another. There is clearly an American Criminal Justice
System, with dominant ideas about order and authority, but it
often speaks with a recognizable local accent. Those often minor
variations, on which I have focused in this essay, are surprisingly
persistent and may have very deep roots. They reflect small but
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. American mobility may offer one explanation for the persistence of
some of these differences, as individuals move to regions of the country where
others who share their views already live. The Cavaliers and Quakers may
have gotten the ball rolling, but perhaps mobility explains some of the
persistence of these attitudes.
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important differences in our ideas of what it means to transgress
and why we punish, differences deeper and more nuanced than
which of the four traditional reasons for punishment we prefer.
Deeper than our commitment to retribution or rehabilitation is
how we think about the social order and our place in it. Do we see
ourselves in relation to, and included in, a social order that made
us all equal before God, as did the Puritans and the Quakers? Do
we see ourselves in opposition to it, as did the Lowland Scots or
very much in terms of our hierarchical place in the established
social order, as did the Cavaliers? Each answer may lead us to
punish crime differently, as I have argued above, and also to
emphasize different kinds of transgressions in our criminal law.
Regional attitudes about income and alcohol tax enforcement may,
in part, reflect these differences.
It also bears noting that I have only talked a little bit about
four regions settled by English speakers in the early history of our
nation. I offer no speculation about the impact of other cultures in
those regions or in other parts of the country. The west coast has
a long Latino tradition, Louisiana has always had the influence of
its Civil Law past and we are now integrating many new
Americans who bring folkways from Asia and Africa. There are
stories to be told in each of those regions and new stories, yet to be
lived, of how those folkways will combine or interact with those
already here.
But with all those caveats, and recognizing that there are
many different levels of analysis, it still seems valuable to
recognize that the great American experiment in combining
diverse groups has always been characterized by the pull of great
unifying moments and the push of compromises that permit
sectional, and other, differences to coexist in our federal structure.
That story can be told about big issues on which compromise was
ultimately impossible and unwise, like slavery, and about other
matters on which ongoing compromise is the only viable solution,
such as sectional differences on international trade policies. Much
ink has been spilled arguing that sentencing is a matter of
principle and that disparity is a simple injustice which cannot be
tolerated. It seems to me that local control and variation is the
cornerstone of American criminal law and although I recognize
the importance and appeal of a uniform federal law, there may
well be deeply embedded limits to uniformity.
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The Guidelines came into being at a time when untrammeled
judicial discretion was no longer tolerable, as it rubbed up against
the pull of equal treatment. The Guidelines were just one part of
the tremendous nationalization of our criminal law in the second
half of the twentieth century, realized through federalization,
Model Penal Code recodification and the emergence of criminal
law as a great political issue at all levels of government. The
trend toward greater uniformity in our criminal law was itself just
one aspect of the great homogenization of American culture that
characterized the post-World War II period.
But nationalization and the move to uniformity can usher in a
responsive, or corrective, sentiment for sectionalism. Seen in this
light, Booker was a corrective to an excessive push for national
uniformity. Just as untrammeled discretion became intolerable,
so too did the irritation caused by the conflicting sensibilities
about punishment in different parts of the country. New Yorkers
were never happy with attempts to compel them to punish crime
in exactly the same way as Virginians, who were no more happy to
have New York or Massachusetts ideas of order and punishment
forced upon them.
I have argued elsewhere that Booker can be understood as the
latest installment of the Supreme Court effort to police the
boundaries among the branches and restore judicial authority
after a period of legislative and executive ascendancy in criminal
law and sentencing.66 Today I have argued to you that the same
legal developments are also an effort to rebalance the power of
regional and national visions of our criminal law. Being citizens
of one nation and subject to federal law, citizens of Boston and
Richmond could not go on sentencing defendants in federal court
as if each judge were a representative of a sovereign, state-based
district. But correcting that problem did not erase the
fundamental regional differences a federal state can celebrate, if it
can find the right middle ground between total rigidity and
completely individualized sentencing.
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